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1 Introduction
At least one hundred countries around the world have public old-age pension programs. These share
several common striking features.1 First, over 70% of these countries pay pension benefits in a way as
to discourage work by their elderly citizens. This is starkly evident from the fact that retirement, nearly
everywhere, is a necessary condition for receiving full public pension benefits. In addition, governments
use a variety of “stick and carrot” measures to dissuade the elderly from seeking work: high implicit
taxes and earnings penalties on income earned beyond a certain age act as sticks while generous benefits
act as carrots. Second, an important prerequisite for receiving public pension benefits in almost every
case is a documented history of labor market participation. Finally, public pension programs generally
have pay-as-you-go features implying substantial intergenerational redistribution. In fact, the cross-
cohort redistribution is quantitatively much more important than redistribution in any other dimension
by these programs.2
In this paper, we provide a positive theory of why pension programs exist and why they exhibit
these features. In particular, our current focus is on the intergenerational income redistribution mo-
tive of social security. Assuming away political economy considerations or equity concerns, how can
we explain the fact that cross-cohort income redistribution is such a major focus of pension programs
around the world? Our reasoning for how pension programs achieve this redistribution is as follows.
First, by requiring a long employment history as a prerequisite for participation in the program, pension
programs induce the young to work for less in return for future transfer payments. In this manner, they
also redistribute bargaining power, and hence income away from the young and towards the elderly
and eligible. Second, as a result of high implicit taxes on elderly work, public pensions clearly have
the potential to aﬀect the labor market participation decisions of the elderly. By discouraging work
among the jobless old, they may improve the allocation of workers to jobs in the labor market.3 Such
redistribution can have important welfare eﬀects and this may explain why cross-cohort income redis-
tribution is such a primary focus of pension programs around the world.4 Indeed, as we demonstrate
below, public pensions can generate higher aggregate welfare than if no pension program exists. In
1For a complete and illuminating discussion of these and many other features of old age pension programs, see Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin (2003), and Gruber and Wise (1999).
2See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2003) for details.
3 In related work, Shimer (2001) also studies the implications of population aging for the labor market. He shows
that young workers work for less due to their lack of labor market experience while we show this eﬀect can be entirely
induced by public pension programs. In contrast to our work, all workers in his model are infinitely-lived and in each
period, a new generation of workers is born. Our methodology is most closely related to Pissarides (1992) who utilizes a
two-period overlapping generations model with labor market frictions to study the implications of the loss of productivity
that may accompany long-term unemployment. In contrast to our framework, all jobs in his model only last for one period,
and there are no costs to labor market participation. While his analysis provides a number of interesting implications
for aggregate labor market outcomes, it does not address the important interactions between wages at each stage of the
lifecycle, age-targeted labor market policies (such as public pension programs), and retirement decisions.
4Mulligan (2000) discusses a number of explanations for the design of social security programs. Based on his analysis, he
determines that public pension programs emphasize both induced retirement and intergenerational income redistribution.
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short, having a pension program makes good welfare sense because it encourages the aforementioned,
eﬃciency-enhancing, cross-cohort income redistribution.
We produce an analytically tractable overlapping generations model with a labor market character-
ized by search and matching frictions. In the simplest setting, new born workers live for two periods but
old workers, further ahead on the lifecycle, have only a period of life left. All young agents are jobless
to begin with; they must incur some costs before they may search for employment opportunities. Firms
post vacancies also at a cost and enter the labor market only if there are profits to be made from doing
so. There is a standard non-discriminating matching technology that connects vacancies to workers.5
Newly established employment relationships produce less revenue than when a worker is retained with a
firm from the previous period.6 For these reasons, an individual worker’s position along the lifecycle will
have a significant impact on labor market outcomes. Once job matches are formed, production takes
place, and payoﬀs to workers and firms are determined by a process of symmetric Nash bargaining.
Matches survive for a minimum (maximum) length of one (two) period(s). If a worker gets separated
from a match, he becomes a displaced worker, and may re-enter the labor market to seek employment
the following period.
We go on to introduce a simple and stylized old-age pension program with the following feature:
any old worker who worked when young is eligible to receive a fixed level of benefits. We focus on a
particular pattern of labor market participation, one in which pension benefits successfully induce only
displaced workers to withdraw from the labor force.7 We then address the question: why do pension
programs foster inter-generational income redistribution? To see this, first consider a world without
any public pension programs. In such a world, young workers, by virtue of having more time remaining
in the labor market to search for jobs would have higher bargaining power than older workers in wage
negotiations. As a consequence, the young who form the bulk of the job seekers, would earn higher
wages than a significant number of old workers, thereby leading to high aggregate payroll costs.
The cross-cohort income redistributive nature of pension programs can now be explained as a conse-
quence of the eligibility criteria for receiving benefits: workers must have a documented history of labor
market participation. By requiring the young to work in order to receive transfer payments when old,
pension programs raise the future value of current employment, thereby allowing employers to recruit
5One could interpret this matching technology as representing an economy with full enforcement of age discrimination
laws.
6 In this manner, we incorporate the role of quasi-fixed costs [Oi (1965)] and firm-specific human capital as stressed in
the labor economics literature. See also Hurd (1996) and OECD (1994).
7Can the allocation of workers to jobs be improved by removing some old jobless workers from the labor market? We
oﬀer the following argument. If the age composition of the labor force is heavily skewed towards the elderly, then firms may
not find it profitable to incur the upfront (unrecouperable) cost and create a vacancy. Why? While post-match bargaining
ensures a correct division of the post-match surplus, it does not compensate the firm for its pre-match sunk cost. The
firm can best spread this cost (and allow for accumulation of firm-specific knowledge) if it becomes matched with a young
worker, who is likely to stay with the firm for two periods, as opposed to an old worker. It follows that policies that change
the age-composition of the labor force may have real eﬀects on job creation.
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the young at lower wages. In turn, they also raise the option value to not working for the old and eligible.
In fact, if there are significant implicit taxes on elderly work, older workers through wage negotiations
will seek additional compensation to make up for the loss of retirement benefits.
A novelty of our analysis is that we identify a new channel by which pension programs engineer
redistribution. In our setup, cross-cohort redistribution can take place indirectly via firms in the form
of higher (lower) wages for the old (young) in addition to the standard pay-as-you-go transfers. Im-
portantly, we show the magnitude of redistribution via firms can be non-trivial. The potential sub-
stitutability of one form of redistribution for another is an important, yet neglected dimension in the
debate about social security reform currently in progress in all OECD countries.
Using analytical tools, we go on to study additional features of pension programs that successfully
induce only the old and displaced workers to withdraw from the labor market. We find that increasing
the generosity of such programs raises the employment rate and may also generate higher aggregate
welfare. In contrast, increased aging of the workforce reduces the employment rate since it lowers
the likelihood of firms meeting a young worker. Therefore, the problem of youth unemployment may
actually be exacerbated by population aging since older workers will be crowding out young workers
in the labor market. This suggests that in a world with increased “greying” of populations, shifting
policy attention to the unemployment problems of the elderly at the cost of reduced focus on youth
unemployment can worsen the allocation of workers to jobs. Finally, we demonstrate the precise sense in
which stiﬀer earnings penalties and more generous benefits are complementary instruments for improving
labor market eﬃciency.
We extend our framework to examine the general equilibrium consequences of policy-induced re-
tirement by formally incorporating a government budget constraint along with other stylized features
of public pension programs into the model. Although introducing these additional aspects of pensions
allows us to draw additional insights into the consequences of induced retirement, it also renders our
model less tractable. In particular, now the tax rates respond endogenously to the parameters of the
pension program and other labor market variables. We use numerical simulations to show that our
earlier insights are robust to settings where pension programs are internally funded. Our main results
are summarized as follows. For a given earnings restriction on elderly labor market income, policy-
induced retirement can lead to higher aggregate labor market welfare by lowering payroll costs for the
young and also encouraging the formation of firm-specific human capital during a worker’s lifetime.
However, in an economy where the earnings test is eliminated, pension programs achieve: (i) better
income redistribution, (ii) more labor market participation, and (iii) more vacancy creation due to the
eﬀect of pension programs on age earnings profiles in the economy. Therefore, although we demonstrate
that policy-induced retirement may lead to higher welfare than in the absence of public pensions, recent
reforms aimed at reducing work disincentives towards the elderly allow the redistributive role of social
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security to function more eﬀectively. Our results also suggest that the welfare eﬀects of promoting total
employment may be more important than improving the quality of employment (by encouraging the
elderly to “free up” jobs for the young).
The paper that is closest in spirit to our paper is Sala-i-Martin (1996). In his setup, the old are
assumed to be less productive than the young. Moreover, since there are spillovers in the production
technology resulting from the average level of labor productivity, the old lower the productivity of the
young in the economy. Social security helps induce the old to pull out of the labor force, thereby
raising the average level of labor productivity in the economy and promoting economic growth. In
contrast, we abstract away from possible diﬀerences between young and old workers, except for their
naturally diﬀerent positions along the lifecycle and their labor market experiences. In particular, we
consider that older workers who retain employment with the same firm will be more productive due to
the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. Also, in our setting, gross output from a match with
either a young or a newly employed old worker is the same. Interestingly, our mechanisms are suﬃcient
to open a eﬃciency-enhancing role for social security.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline the model environment,
specify the timeline of events, describe the various search-related costs, and compute payoﬀs to firms
and workers. In Section 3, we compute wages and discuss the properties of the wage function for young
workers, especially its connection to pension benefits. Section 4 defines an equilibrium in our model
and describes a result on existence and uniqueness. As a benchmark for the eﬀects of social security
and induced retirement, Section 5 outlines an equilibrium in which there are no public pensions and
all workers participate in the labor market. Section 6 establishes the “positive” aspect of our analysis
by demonstrating that economies can obtain higher welfare under public pension programs that cause
retirement to occur. In Section 7, we study the general equilibrium eﬀects of changes in the level of
pension benefits on various endogenous variables. In addition, it also considers the role of population
aging for the eﬀects of pension programs. In Section 8, we discuss general equilibrium eﬀects of the
design of pension programs along with their impact on labor supply decisions across the lifecycle. Section
9 contains some concluding remarks. Proofs of important results are contained in the appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy consisting of an infinite discrete sequence of two-period lived overlapping genera-
tions and populated by two types of agents, workers and firms. There is no population growth. In each
period, there are workers of two diﬀerent ages — the young (with measure 12) and the old. A fraction
d of all young workers die at the end of the first period of life implying that the total population of
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workers is equal to (2− d) /2 each period.8
At birth, all workers are jobless. Old workers may be in one of three possible states: the long-term
unemployed (those who did not find jobs when young), displaced (they were employed while young,
but have involuntarily lost their job; see discussion below), or employed.9 All workers are risk-neutral.
There are no saving instruments. Firms produce a homogeneous consumption good each period using
labor as the sole factor of production. Production is the result of pairwise matching between one worker
and a firm. Firms are infinitely-lived with a total population of measure F in each period. They each
have access to the same technology and seek to maximize the present discounted stream of revenues net
of all costs. Workers and firms share the same discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) .
2.2 Time line
The time line is as follows. At the start of each period, the labor market opens. At that time, jobless
workers, be they old or young (the new born agents), choose whether to search for vacancies or not. If
they decide to search, they incur a search cost, s, which is expressed in terms of disutility of search.
As described in Pissarides (2000), s represents the imputed value of leisure in terms of output (utility).
On the other side of the market, firms make the decision whether to pay some upfront costs (described
below) and enter the labor market to look for employees. Each firm may employ at most one worker.
Let U (Fv) denote the total mass of unemployed workers (unfilled vacancies) at the start of a period.
A stochastic matching technology connects all job seekers with open vacancies. The technology
does not discriminate on the basis of age, and therefore, any job seeker (old or young) faces the same
(endogenous) probability α of getting matched with a vacancy.10 Once the labor market opens, firms and
workers have at most one opportunity to meet and match. At the end of any period, the employment
relationship between a worker and a firm ends involuntarily with a given probability b.11 Put diﬀerently,
a given match lasts for a minimum (maximum) length of one (two) period(s).
At the beginning of the period, a surviving old worker finds himself in one of three possible employ-
ment categories: employed [attached to a match from the previous period with probability α (1− b)],
unemployed [with probability (1−α)], or displaced (working when young, but lost the job with probabil-
ity αb).12 On-the-job search is disallowed by our assumption regarding timing of labor market openings.
8Then, the fraction of old to young people in the population is given by (1− d). We can think of a fall in d as increased
longevity that leads to a steady-state representing aging of the population.
9Following Pissarides (1992), we refer to those who did not find jobs when young as the long-term unemployed. Since
displaced workers are individuals who found job matches when young, but incurred a job separation, we can also refer to
them as ‘separated’ workers. Hence, we use the terms ‘displaced’ and ‘separated’ interchangeably.
10Our matching structure bears many similarities to Pissarides (1992). As in his framework, workers and firms may make
at most one job contact each period, and the probabilities of matching are the same for each type of worker irrespective
of age (i.e., we also assume a non-discriminating matching technology).
11All job separations in the model are exogenous and outside of the worker’s influence. In this sense, b is a measure of
the frequency of involuntary job separations, and therefore, parameterizes the degree of job security. See Gottschalk and
Moﬃtt (1999) for related discussion.
12Long term job attachment is an important feature of labor market behavior. For example, 34% of U.S. male workers
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For future reference, note that the long-term unemployed, unlike displaced workers, have no prior his-
tory of labor force attachment. This will create a distinction between them if governmental transfer
payments are contingent on their employment history.13 At the end of the period, young employed
workers learn their employment status for the following date (i.e., whether their current match survives
to the next period or gets dissolved); at this time, old workers die for sure.
2.3 The Labor Market
As discussed in the introduction, public pension programs in many countries aim to induce retirement
by the elderly so as to alleviate unemployment among the young. In this paper, we focus solely on
the role played by public pension programs in encouraging the jobless elderly to withdraw from the
labor market.14 In many European countries, for example, workers can collect early retirement benefits
after an involuntary separation. In France, the “contrat de solidarité” recognizes the “double need to
encourage 55-59 year-old workers to stop work and to bring young workers into the labor market, as
rising youth unemployment was a growing concern to society as a whole.” A precondition to receiving
unemployment benefits for people over the age of 55 is that they stop “seeking employment”.15
We formally motivate these ideas in a setting where an individual’s position along the lifecycle
aﬀects his opportunities in the labor market. Furthermore, the participation decisions of all workers
have general equilibrium implications through their impact on the number of job vacancies created by
firms. En route to studying the possible desirability of policies that aﬀect labor market participation by
the elderly, we analyze a setting where a particular subset of workers chooses to retire. In particular, we
consider the general equilibrium consequences of public policies that encourage displaced (separated)
workers to withdraw from the labor market.
In terms of deriving the endogenous labor market participation decisions of all workers (in particular,
aged 25 and over had worked for their current employer for 10 years or more in February 2000; for workers aged 55-64, 28%
had worked for their current employer 20 years or more. In addition, Hall (1982) finds that after a job has lasted 5 years,
the probability that it will eventually last 20 years or more in all rises to close to 0.5 among workers in their early thirties.
These data imply that tenure with a firm can be quite long. The low frequency nature of our overlapping generations
setup is well-suited to capture this aspect of the labor market. It bears emphasis that job turnover in our framework is
entirely involuntary.
13This is one of the benefits of our deterministic, discrete-time model. Since each worker receives only one job contact
each period, it is very easy to trace an old worker’s employment status to his employment history. The linkages between
eligibility for transfer payments (such as social security) and a worker’s prior labor market history are clearly important,
yet often ignored in models of the labor market.
14Displacement is an important route towards retirement in many OECD countries. For example, Chan and Stevens
(2002) show that displacement increases the probability of retirement in the U.S. labor market. Specifically, they emphasize
that this may be due to the costs of job search and loss of firm-specific human capital. O’Leary and Wandner (2000)
conclude that while less than 10% of displaced workers under the age of 55 permanently exit the labor force, more than
25% between the ages of 55 and 64 and almost half of workers over the age of 65 opt for retirement instead of searching
for alternative sources of employment upon displacement. Diamond and Hausman (1984) also discuss how job loss among
older workers leads to retirement.
15 In Britain, the Job Release Scheme which ran between 1977 and 1988, “specifically encouraged older workers to stand
down to make way for younger ones. Once out of employment, changes to the unemployment benefit regime in 1983
removed the requirement for men over 60 to look for work, encouraging them to see themselves as retired.” For more
details, see the OECD (1995) study on “The Labor Market and Older Workers”.
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old workers), we adopt the following algorithm. We first condition on a set of strategies where all
separated workers have chosen to withdraw from the labor market by accepting retirement benefits
rather than incurring the costs of job search. We then study how public pensions must be designed in
order to support the conjectured steady-state equilibrium. We proceed by verifying that a separated
worker is better oﬀ choosing to collect pension benefits rather than searching for a job. This is the
algorithm we adopt in order to endogenize labor force participation for every type of worker at each
stage of the lifecycle.
2.4 Costs
Firms incur sunk costs of posting vacancies, denoted by a. Once they have incurred this cost and
searched for workers, all firms are equally likely to find a worker. The probability that a vacancy finds
a worker is θ (to be determined in equilibrium below). The probabilities of meeting a given type of
worker, however, will depend on the proportion of each type in the labor market. In our conjectured
equilibrium, only the young and the long-term unemployed actively search for jobs. While the total
measure of unemployed workers is U, the total measures of the young and long-term unemployed are
uy and uo. The probability of finding a young unemployed worker is θu˜y, where u˜y ≡
uy
U
. Similarly,
the probability that a vacancy locates a long-term unemployed worker is θu˜o. The next lemma reports
these population proportions for future use.
Lemma 1
U =
1 + (1− α) (1− d)
2
u˜y ≡
uy
U
=
1
1 + (1− α) (1− d)
u˜o ≡
uo
U
=
(1− α) (1− d)
1 + (1− α) (1− d)
An important point to note here is that the population proportions are all endogenous variables
since they depend on α. An implication of this is that policies aimed at altering the age-composition
of the labor force also change these proportions, and thereby aﬀect the probability with which firms
encounter workers of other age groups. This general equilibrium eﬀect is at the heart of our analysis.
Following the insights of Oi (1962) and Hutchens (1986), we posit that there are costs which must
be incurred at the beginning of an employment relationship. We refer to these as “hiring” costs, and
denote them as h. Let the exogenously-determined market value of the firm’s output be normalized to
1. Matches with new hires require the firm and the worker to incur the costs of “hiring and training” so
that the net output from new matches is (1− h) while net output from a match with an old, retained
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worker is 1.16 Under this interpretation, one may view h as a cost that is incurred each time a firm
makes a new hire. Alternatively, h may proxy a productivity diﬀerential between new and old matches.
In the latter sense, one may also interpret h as a parameter which reflects the importance of firm-specific
human capital. Firms therefore derive higher net revenues from employing workers with longer expected
tenure.
The wage rate(s) for the diﬀerent types of workers are determined (see below) in accordance with
the protocols of Nash bargaining. As shown there, the presence of age-targeted labor market policies
and the aforementioned accumulation of firm-specific human capital will cause the wages of workers
(with diﬀerent employment histories) to vary.
2.5 Specification of Labor Market Policies
We incorporate various aspects of real-world age-specific labor market policies, such as public pension
programs and long-term old-age unemployment insurance programs, into our model. These take a
particularly simple and stylized form. Old workers, currently or previously employed, are eligible for
transfer payments from the government. As is common in many countries, these payments are tied to a
worker’s prior attachment to the labor market. In that vein, we assume that an individual who worked
when young is potentially eligible for a fixed lump sum benefit of B0. In Section 8, we allow for pension
benefits to be directly tied to past wages.
We also allow for aspects of earnings reductions, as observed in many programs, in our framework.
We capture the notion of an “earnings test” by asserting that workers who work when old receive only
a fraction δ of benefits due to them.17
018 For example, suppose that an old worker who retained her job
from a previous match receives a wage of weo. Then gross of pension benefits, he obtains total income
in the amount weo + δB0. Since we conjecture that displaced workers choose to retire, in equilibrium,
they earn total income B0. The long-term unemployed are not eligible for benefits since they have no
documented history of labor force attachment.19
16Note that our framework diﬀers from the standard search-theoretic model with ex-ante heterogeneity. Although one
may view the old, retained workers in our setup as “high” types and the displaced and the long-term unemployed workers
as “low” types, the probability of becoming a “high” type is endogenous. This is an important distinguishing feature of
our model. In particular, as we demonstrate below, the chance of becoming a “high” type will be crucially aﬀected by
policy.
17The “earnings test” that was applied in the United States until 2000 could be described as follows. In 1999, a worker
age 62 to 65 could earn up to $9,600 without the loss of any benefits, then benefits were reduced $1 for each $2 of earnings
above this amount; for workers age 65 to 69, the earnings test floor was $15,500 and benefits were reduced at a rate of $1
for each $3 in earnings. Although our framework is not suited to capture the specific features of various versions of the
earnings test, we can consider its implications, more broadly defined, for retirement behavior and wages of older workers.
18 In our specification, the higher the value of δ, the lower is the implicit tax rate on elderly work. Gruber and Wise
(1999) find that while this tax is relatively low in the United States (around 20%), it is much higher in a number of
European countries (as much as 80%).
19For now, we ignore issues relating to funding of these programs. The consequent analytical tractability allows us to
explicitly endogenize the labor market participation patterns on the basis of the design of public pension programs and
formally prove existence of the conjectured steady-state equilibrium. In Sections 6 and 8, we study the eﬀects of pension
programs under a balanced budget constraint.
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In order to study the desirability (or lack thereof) of public pension programs that induce workers of
certain ages and employment histories to withdraw from the labor market, we will henceforth construct
the model under the conjecture that public policies successfully induce only the separated workers to
leave the labor market, and collect B0. In our analysis below, we will provide a set of suﬃcient conditions
under which this conjectured equilibrium exists.20
2.6 Workers’ Payoﬀs
Let Jy denote the expected lifetime utility accruing to a worker who decides to search when young, Jeo
the expected utility of an old worker who begins the period employed and continues his employment,
Juo the expected utility of an old worker who did not get matched when young and is back in the labor
market seeking employment, and Jso the expected utility of an old separated (displaced) worker. Then,
it is easy to see that
Jy = −s+ α [wy + (1− d) (1− b)βJeo + b (1− d)βJso ] + (1− α) (1− d)βJuo (1)
Juo = −s+ αwuo ; Jeo = weo + δBo (2)
Jso = Bo (3)
It is instructive to explore the economic interpretation of eq. (1), as the explanations of the other
value functions follow straightforwardly. A young worker seeking employment incurs an upfront cost
s. Upon entering the labor market, he gets matched with a firm with probability α. In that case, he
gets a wage wy and, if he survives, also the expected discounted continuation payoﬀs from possible
employment and separation the following period. If he is unsuccessful in finding a job, and if he is alive
at the start of the next period, he will find himself in the state of being a long-term unemployed worker.
>From (1), it is also clear that the value of a job to a young worker is much more than just the current
wage. Because jobs are potentially durable (long-lasting), a match today bestows certain continuation
privileges to the worker, a fact that will play a prominent role during the wage-bargaining phase.21
2.7 Payoﬀs to firms
Firms begin each period in one of two possible states. They may currently have a vacancy, or they
may be matched with an old worker from a previous employment relationship. Letting Πv (Πf ) be the
20Pissarides (1976), in an infinite-horizon model with sequential search, also studies the choice of labor market partici-
pation. He derives the optimal number of times individuals will choose to search for jobs before becoming “discouraged”
and withdrawing from the labor market. However, he does not consider the role of the lifecycle in his analysis. His model
also does not address how labor market participation is influenced by pension or labor market policies.
21Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1994) demonstrate how the durability of jobs results in a social surplus when workers
have finite lives in an infinite-horizon economy. However, unlike their paper, we embed this idea into an overlapping
generations framework. In addition, we explicitly introduce important features of pension programs which reinforce the
role of employment beyond current compensation thereby leading to intergenerational income redistribution.
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expected lifetime profits of a firm that has an unfilled (filled) vacancy at the beginning of the period,
the following equations describe the associated expected present discounted profits of a firm in each
state:
Πv = −a+ θu˜y {(1− h−wy) + (1− d) [(1− b)βΠf + bβΠv] + dβΠv} (4)
+θu˜o {[1− h− wuo ] + βΠv}+ (1− θ)βΠv
Πf = (1− weo) +Πv (5)
As indicated above, if the firm is currently matched with an old worker, it will have a vacancy next
period it if incurs the cost a. Note that the firm does not face any hiring costs if the employment
relationship from the previous period is retained. Also note that firms take the proportions, u˜y and u˜o,
as given when deciding whether to enter the labor market.
The following closed form expression for steady state payoﬀ to entry will be of considerable use
below:
Πv =
−a+ θu˜y (1− h− wy) + θu˜y(1− d)(1− b)β(1− weo) + θu˜o (1− h− wuo )£
1− θu˜y(1− d)(1− b)β2 − θu˜y(1− d)bβ − θu˜ydβ − θu˜oβ − (1− θ)β
¤ . (6)
2.8 Matching
Unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies are brought together each period through a stochastic match-
ing technology. The matching technology describes the total number of matches, m = µM(U,Fv), that
are formed at the beginning of each period, depending on the total masses of unemployed workers and
unfilled vacancies. Since α represents the probability that an unemployed worker will find any vacancy
in the time period and θ is the probability that any unfilled vacancy will find an unemployed worker,
it follows that the total number of workers who find employment (α · U) must equal the total number
of firms that filled their vacancies (θ · Fv): α · U = θ · Fv. It is important to note that α and θ are
determined in equilibrium, and that both workers and firms take them as given when making their
decisions. Noting that m = θ · Fv, we have
αU = θFv = m = µM(U,Fv) (7)
the matching condition. It is standard to assume that the matching technology takes the Cobb-Douglas
form: m = µ(U)1−φ(Fv)φ where φ ∈ [0, 1]. Noting that θFv = µ(U)1−φ(Fv)φ, it follows that θ =h
µ
³
U
Fv
´i1−φ
. An increase in either the number of unemployed workers or unfilled vacancies increases
the number of matches each period, but at a decreasing rate. Ceteris paribus, more matches occur when
µ is higher.
For analytical tractability, in some of what we do below, we will assume φ = 1. Then, θ = µ ≤ 1
obtains. In fact, it is easiest to conduct our analysis (and obtain closed form solutions to various
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endogenous variables) for the case where θ = µ = 1. This implies thatM(U,Fv) = Fv. Vacancies always
find a worker, but workers may find a vacancy only with a probability α ∈ (0, 1) that will be determined
below.22 In such an economy, the congestion problems facing unemployed workers are severe. Below,
we will remark on how our results depend on the extent of congestion problems encountered by both
workers and vacancies.
3 Bargaining and Wage Determination
The friction inbuilt into the job-firm matching process creates the possibility that a firm may remain
unproductive or a worker may remain unemployed in any period. Firms and workers must therefore
weigh the implications of finding themselves in these states and their outside options when bargaining
over their share of current and future surplus produced. Two important things deserve mention here.
First, the outside options available to workers are crucially aﬀected by policy, and second, these outside
options are dependent on past employment history and on one’s position in the lifecycle. Below, we
will demonstrate the powerful implications of this last observation. To foreshadow, we will establish
the presence of a “skewness” in bargaining power towards the young, and the role played by pension
programs in “undoing” some of the resultant inequities.
3.0.1 Wage functions
We now turn to the determination of the wage oﬀer functions for both young and old workers. Matches
between workers and unfilled vacancies leads to a surplus that is to be divided between the worker and
the firm. Nash bargaining dictates that the total match surplus be shared by the firm and the worker;
principally for analytical tractability, we assume symmetric Nash bargaining. For an old worker with an
unbroken employment relationship from the previous period, the gain from the match is [weo + δB0]−B0.
The corresponding gain to the firm is (1− weo +Πv)−Πv = 1− weo.23 Then, Nash bargaining implies
weo =
1 + (1− δ)Bo
2
(8)
Analogously, it follows that the wages to a long-term unemployed worker (one who has no history of
labor force attachment) is given by
wuo =
(1− h)
2
. (9)
22We only study equilibria in which there are more unemployed workers than vacancies. Hence, we have both U < Fv
and α < 1 in our analysis.
23We assume that even when a match survives on to the second period, wages are determined by a fresh process of
bargaining at the start of the second period.
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Finally, we turn to the wage determination for a young worker. The gains from trade for the firm are
given by
1− h− wy + β [(1− d) bΠv + (1− b) (1− d)Πf + dΠv −Πv] (10)
while the young worker’s surplus from finding employment is given by
wy + β [b (1− d)Jso + (1− b) (1− d)Jeo − (1− d)Juo ] (11)
The analytical expression for the wages accruing to a young worker is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 a) The expression for the wage function for the young is given by
2wy = (1− h)
µ
1 +
βα (1− d)
2
¶
− (1− d)β (B0 + s) (12)
b) If (1− h) > β (B0 + s), then wy > 0.
Note that part b) of Lemma 2 is a suﬃcient condition for young workers to earn positive wages,
since it holds for any possible value of α.
Ceteris paribus, higher search costs s, reduce the wages to the young by reducing the option value
to waiting and searching in the future. It also follows that, ceteris paribus, a higher pension benefit B0,
reduce the wages to the young, an issue to which we now turn.
3.0.2 Discussion of the wage function for the young
Suppose for the moment that all public pension programs are absent, i.e., B0 = 0. In this case, using
(8)-(9), we have:
wuo =
(1− h)
2
, weo =
1
2
Also, using (11), the young worker’s surplus from finding employment is given by:
wy + β(1− b) (1− d)weo − β (1− d)Juo .
and, using (10), the firm’s surplus (assuming free entry) from hiring the young worker is given by:
1− h− wy + β(1− b) (1− d) (1− weo) .
Equating, we get
wy =
(1− h)
2
+ β(1− b) (1− d) (1− weo)− β(1− b) (1− d)weo +
β (1− d)
2
Juo (13)
A young worker can expect that his job will last beyond the current period. The wage function for
young workers reflects this via the fact that the value of employment this period is more than just the
13
current wage. Several insights are immediate from an examination of (13). First, ceteris paribus, higher
wages (if the worker is alive and retained in the future) serve to lower current wages. This is additional
surplus that a young worker will obtain in the future if the match is sustained. Since this represents
a source of gain from working when young, the firm extracts this future surplus by paying the worker
lower wages this period. In addition, if the employment relationship is sustained, then the firm will
have more net revenues next period. Since the surplus, (1 − weo), represents additional revenues that
the firm will obtain in the future from hiring a young worker, the worker is able to extract his share of
that expected surplus. Second, if the young worker’s “threat point” in bargaining increases in the sense
that the value to waiting for a period and then searching rises, his wages must rise.
Now consider a situation where employment is possibly temporary (b < 1) but workers live for two
periods for sure (d = 0) . Then,
wy =
∙
(1− h)
2
+
1
2
βJuo
¸
> wuo
would obtain. It is now apparent that inequities in bargaining power over the lifecycle arise, purely
because of agents’ positions on the lifecycle. Young workers, who have the option of searching for jobs
when old, will have a higher threat point in negotiating over wages than old workers (who have no such
outside option). 24
We are now in a position to isolate a key social function played by pension programs towards reducing
the aforementioned inequity. To see this, recall that young workers (by virtue of the fact that they likely
have a period ahead of them) have higher bargaining power than the old. Also a fundamental eligibility
criterion for receiving pensions when old is a history of labor force attachment. Employment when
young therefore raises the worker’s expected net income in the future. The bargaining power of a young
worker (arising from their position in the lifecycle) is therefore partially reduced because the firm is
aware that having a job today implies current (and future) benefits to the employee; the firm naturally
extracts part of that surplus. It is in this sense that public pensions help redistribute bargaining power
from young to old workers, raising the wages for the old and eligible and reducing the wages of the
young.25
The above discussion was based entirely on “ceteris paribus” arguments, since α was held constant
throughout the discussion. We now turn to the determination of α along with all other endogenous
variables.
24 It is important to note here that past private earnings do not aﬀect a worker’s current bargaining strength because of
our earlier assumption ruling out any form of asset accumulation or saving.
25Black (1987) also finds that social security aﬀects age-earnings profiles. In his model, workers would rather receive
private pension payments than wages as a result of social security taxes. As workers become older, they switch from
pension payments to wages since the returns from pension savings would be lower. Therefore, social security tends to
generate upward-sloping age earnings profiles. In his work, the retirement date is exogenous (he does not explore the early
retirement incentives in the social security system). In addition, there is no unemployment in his model.
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4 Equilibrium
4.1 Definition and Existence
We focus exclusively on time-invariant equilibria. This will allow us to investigate the properties of
long-run equilibria in the labor market. A steady-state equilibrium with no labor market participation
by the displaced (separated) workers is formally defined below.
DEFINITION A steady-state equilibrium with no labor market participation by displaced work-
ers [an “induced retirement equilibrium”] consists of wage functions wy, weo, and w
u
o [defined in (8), (9),
and (12)], policy parameters, B0 and δ, and a quadruple (α, θ, U, Fv) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Symmetric Nash bargaining; (ii) (Unrestricted Entry for firms): Πv = 0 ; (iii) (Steady-State):
αU = θFv = µM(U,Fv), with θ = 1, and (iv) the labor market participation/non-participation con-
straints hold: Juo > 0, Jy > (1− d)βJuo , Jeo > Bo and the displaced worker constraint holds (see below).
4.2 Labor Market Participation Conditions
As stated in the definition of the equilibrium, we impose a pattern of labor market participation across
workers of diﬀerent age groups and employment histories and then state conditions under which this
pattern emerges as an equilibrium. In particular, we study a steady-state equilibrium in which old
workers who have experienced job loss during the course of their careers choose to accept their pension
benefits and withdraw, rather than incur the costs of job search. Old individuals who have retained
their jobs continue working since they have higher productivity than when they were initially employed.
In contrast, the long-term unemployed with no access to pension benefits choose to look for jobs. We
also provide conditions to ensure that the young actively search for jobs.
We begin with a discussion of the participation conditions for old workers who have retained jobs
from their youth. In order for them to continue working, we must have
Jeo = w
e
o + δBo > Bo. (14)
which using (8) reduces to 1 > (1− δ)Bo, a suﬃcient condition for which is 1 > Bo.
The next step is to find conditions under which displaced workers choose to accept pension benefits
and retire rather than incur the costs of job search. If a separated worker chooses to accept pension
benefits, his expected utility is: Jso = Bo. However, the decision to withdraw from the labor force must
yield higher expected utility. Therefore, the following condition must hold:
Bo > −s+ αws + αδBo + (1− α)Bo (15)
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Under the assumption that an individual displaced worker chooses to search for a job (an ‘individual’
deviation), with probability α the displaced worker would be able to obtain employment and would
earn total income (ws + δBo). In this event, the wage he would earn is given by:
ws =
(1− h) + (1− δ)Bo
2
(16)
Alternatively, if unable to find employment, the worker would still be able to collect pension benefits.
Using (16) in (15), it follows that policy- induced withdrawal by displaced workers occurs if (1− h) >
(1− δ)Bo and
α <
2s
[(1− h)− (1− δ)Bo]
(17)
holds. This provides an upper-bound for α.
In contrast, for the long-term unemployed to search for jobs, we require that:
Juo = −s+ αwuo > 0
Using (9), this condition may be rewritten to provide a minimal value for α for which the long-term
unemployed remain active in the labor market:
α >
2s
(1− h) (18)
Obviously, if the search costs are too high, the long-term unemployed would be better oﬀ choosing not
to search for jobs. A quick comparison of (17) and (18) reveals the following insight regarding the
earnings test.
Lemma 3 For an induced retirement equilibrium to exist, it is necessary but not suﬃcient that there
be an earnings penalty, i.e., δ < 1 must obtain.
If δ = 1, an induced retirement equilibrium does not exist. Finally, in order for young workers to
search for jobs, the expected utility of participation when young must exceed the value of waiting and
looking for a job when old. This implies that:
Jy = −s+ α [wy + (1− d) (1− b)βJeo + b (1− d)βJso ] + (1− α) (1− d)βJuo > (1− d)βJuo (19)
The following lemma provides conditions on α such that young workers choose to actively search in the
labor market.
Lemma 4 a) Suppose that the displaced worker constraint is satisfied and (1 − h) > (B0 + s). In
addition, let b1 ≡ [(1− h)− (1− d)β (B0 + s)]. If αwy(α) > s, then (19) is satisfied and young workers
will choose to search for jobs, which obtains when
α > αL ≡
−b1 + 2
p
b21 + 4β(1− h)(1− d)s
β (1− d) (1− h) > 0 (20)
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b) αL > 2s(1−h)
To summarize, a valid induced retirement equilibrium value of α must satisfy (17), (18), and (20);
additionally, the level of benefits B0 must satisfy (1− h) > max [(1− δ)Bo, β (B0 + s)] . Henceforth we
will maintain the assumption:
Assumption 1 a)
(1− h) > max [(1− δ)Bo, β (B0 + s)] (21)
b)
3 (1− h) > 4a (22)
4.3 Equilibrium Entry Condition
Firms enter the labor market in search of employees until all profit opportunities from new jobs are
driven to zero. This “free-entry condition” dictates that the expected present value of future profits
attributable to filling the marginal vacancy must equal the cost of vacancy-posting and hiring the next
worker. Utilizing the wage functions described above, along with Πv = 0 [see (6)], we have
³a
θ
´ 1
u˜y
= (1− h− wy) + (1− b)(1− d)β (1− weo) +
µ
u˜o
u˜y
¶
(1− h− wuo ) (23)
Then, setting θ = 1, candidate equilibrium values of α are derived from (23) using Lemma 1, (8), (9),
and (12). One of the major benefits of using a simple matching technology like ours is that closed-form
solutions to (23) can be analytically derived.
The following proposition describes the conditions required for existence of an induced retirement
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 a) The unique solution to (23) in terms of α, is given by
α ≡ α (B0; δ) = 2
⎧
⎨
⎩
βs+ β(1− b) + βB0 [1− (1− b) (1− δ)] +
³
1
(1−d) + 1
´
[(1− h)− 2a]
[(1− h) (2 + β)− 4a]
⎫
⎬
⎭ . (24)
b) Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for α in (24) to be part of an induced retirement equilibrium
with θ = 1, (17), (18), and (20) must hold or, more compactly, the condition
α ∈
½
αL,min
µ
2s
[(1− h)− (1− δ)Bo]
, 1
¶¾
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holds.26
We close this section by presenting two numerical examples of valid steady-state equilibria with
induced retirement, one for the linear-matching (φ = 1) and the other for the non-linear matching
(φ < 1) case.
Example 1 Let s = 0.03, a = 0.266, h = 0.585, d = 0.41, δ = 0.2, β = 0.99, µ = 1, B0 = 0.102, and
b = 0.785. For this parametric specification, α = 0.1471, and for this value of α, all other conditions
outlined in the definition of the induced retirement equilibrium hold.
Example 2 Let s = 0.15, a = 0.2, h = 0.4, d = 0.2, δ = 0.2, β = 0.95, µ = 0.4, B0 = 0.4, b = 0.2,
and φ = 0.8. For this parametric specification, α = 0.7874, and for this value of α, all other conditions
outlined in the definition of the induced retirement equilibrium hold.
5 The absence of policy
In this section, as a benchmark for considering the eﬀects of induced retirement, we briefly outline the
environment in the absence of any policy intervention. Since much of the basic structure of the economy
remains the same, we choose to minimize detailed discussion of the analysis. Additionally, without loss
of generality, we will assume d = 0.
We start by revisiting the value functions describing the expected lifetime utility of workers.
Jy = −s+ α [wy + (1− b)βJeo + bβJuo ] + (1− α)βJuo ; Jeo = weo; Juo = −s+ αwuo
Recall that in the absence of policy, the old separated are indistinguishable from the old never-before-
employed, and can be lumped into the single category of jobless elderly. The value functions for the
firms are the same as before.
It is clear that the wage functions for old jobless workers and retained individuals are the same as
in the previous section since they do not depend on the probability of finding a job. In contrast, the
wage paid to the young is however diﬀerent. Even though the gains from trade to the firm from hiring
a young worker remain the same as before, a young worker’s surplus from finding employment is now
given by
wy + bβJuo + (1− b)βJeo − βJuo = wy + β (1− b) s− β (1− b)αwuo + (1− b)βweo
26For a generic θ, it is easily checked that (24) is given by
α =
2
(1− h) (2 + β)− 4aθ
∙
{ 1
(1− d) + 1}
µ
1− h− 2a
θ
¶
+ (1− (1− b)(1− δ))βB0 + βs+ β(1− b)
¸
which we use later when doing numerical computations with a non-linear matching technology.
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In particular, the surplus reflects that young workers will choose to search for jobs when they become
old since induced retirement does not occur. Under symmetric bargaining, and free entry, it can be
shown that
wnpy =
(1− h)
2
∙
1 +
β (1− b)α
2
¸
− β (1− b) s
2
(25)
where the superscript “np” signifies “no policy”.
The most crucial diﬀerence between the environment with and without policy is in the nature of
the equilibrium. As we have discussed earlier, the case with policy focuses on an equilibrium in which
pension benefits successfully induce the old and separated to withdraw from the labor force. The
appropriate comparison is with a setting without policy intervention in which every jobless worker is in
the labor force.
DEFINITION A steady-state equilibrium without policy intervention and with labor market
participation from all workers consists of wage functions wuo , w
e
o, and wy [defined in (8), (9), and (25)],
and a quadruple (α, θ, U, Fv) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Symmetric Nash bargaining; (ii)
(Unrestricted Entry for firms): Πv = 0; (iii) (Steady-State): αU = θFv = µM(U,Fv), with θnp = 1,
and (iv) the labor market participation constraints hold: Juo > 0, Jy > βJ
u
o , and J
e
o > 0.
As before, firms enter until Π∗v = 0. Analogous to the equilibrium entry condition derived in the
model with policy, it can be checked that
αnp =
4(1− h)− 8a+ 2(1− b) (1 + s)β
(1− b) [(1− h)β + 2 (1− h)− 4a] (26)
We conclude this section with an important result.
Proposition 2 Young workers always earn higher wages in the absence of induced retirement. That
is, wnpy > wy where wy is defined in eq. (12).
This is the crux of the income redistribution argument. Pension policies, by their very nature, raise
the future value of employment, and thereby reduce wages to the young. In the absence of such policies,
as Proposition 2 indicates, the wages of the young are relatively high. Since they form the bulk of the
job seekers, ceteris paribus, a higher wage to the young adversely aﬀects firm entry, and possibly reduces
aggregate worker welfare.
Furthermore, by encouraging old displaced workers to retire, social security programs can play an
important role in improving the allocation of workers to jobs since they allow young workers to more
easily find jobs and accumulate firm-specific human capital. In what follows below, we first aim to
demonstrate our eﬃciency rationale for public pensions and induced retirement. In order to accomplish
this objective, we explicitly introduce a government budget constraint into our framework so that
pensions are funded within the economy. Specifically, we present a setting where payroll taxes imposed
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on both firms and workers are used to pay for pension benefits. Section 6 below establishes that public
pensions through induced retirement can lead to higher welfare than when public pensions are absent.
6 Are pension programs welfare enhancing?
The principal point of this paper is to argue that pension programs, through their eﬀect on the wage
structure, their inducement to pull the old displaced workers out of the labor market, and thereby
encourage firms to create more job vacancies, can improve the operation of the labor market and
might therefore be desirable on eﬃciency grounds alone (abstracting from the more standard equity
and insurance motives). To that end, before discussing the overall eﬀects of pension programs and
their interactions with labor market conditions, we first seek to demonstrate that endogenously funded
pension programs and publicly induced retirement can lead to higher welfare than having no pension
program at all. Below we sketch a version of our model that introduces payroll taxes on workers and
firms which are then used to pay the old separated to stay away from the labor market. We compute
aggregate welfare (defined below) for this economy and compare it to aggregate welfare for the economy
described in Section 5.
Much of the analysis set forth above will remain valid in this section; without loss of generality, we
continue to set d = 0. To begin with, the value functions for workers of diﬀerent types are given by
Jy = −s+ α [(1− τ)wy + (1− b)βJeo + bβJso ] + (1− α)βJuo
Juo = −s+ α(1− τ)wuo , Jeo = [(1− τ)weo + (1− τ)δBo] ,
and, under the conjectured equilibrium that displaced workers do not search,
Jso = (1− τ)Bo
where τ is the common tax rate on wage and benefit income. In addition, in the steady-state we observe:
Πv = −a+ θu˜y {[1− h− (1 + τ)wy] + (1− b)βΠf + bβΠv}+ θu˜o {[1− h− (1 + τ)wuo ] + βΠv}+ (1− θ)βΠv
Πf = 1− (1 + τ)weo + βΠv
It is easily verified that
Πv =
−a+ θu˜y [1− h− (1 + τ)wy] + θu˜y(1− b)β [1− (1 + τ)weo] + θu˜o [1− h− (1 + τ)wuo ]£
1− θu˜y(1− b)β2 − θu˜y(1− b)bβ2 − θu˜oβ − (1− θ)β
¤
Using the process of wage determination analogous to the one described in Section 3 above, it can be
shown that
wuo =
(1− h)
2
; weo =
1 + (1− δ) (1− τ)Bo
2
(27)
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2wy = [(1− h) + (1− b)β {1− (1 + τ)weo}] (28)
− [βb(1− τ)Bo + (1− b)β {(1− τ)weo + δ(1− τ)Bo}− α(1− τ)wuo ]
Utilizing the wage functions described above, along with Πv = 0, we have the same equilibrium entry
condition as in (23) given by
a
θ
µ
1
u˜y
¶
= [1− h− (1 + τ)wy] + (1− b)β [1− (1 + τ)weo] +
µ
u˜o
u˜y
¶
[1− h− (1 + τ)wuo ] (29)
What remains for us to describe is the government budget constraint. The payroll taxes paid by
firms are given by
Fvθu˜oτw
u
o + Fvθu˜yτwy + Ffτw
e
o
since some job vacancies will be filled by the long-term unemployed and others by the young. In addition,
some taxes will be paid by firms with retained workers from prior established employment relationships.
In contrast, taxes paid out by all the workers are given by
ατwy
2
+
α(1− b)τ (weo + δBo)
2
+ αuoτw
u
o +
αb
2
τBo
The expenditure by the government on workers is given by
α(1− b)
2
δBo +
αb
2
Bo
We assume that the government balances its budget. It is also easy to verify that the
Ff =
α(1− b)
2
; Fv =
α(1− b) (2− α)
θ [2(1− b) + α(1− α)] ; F =
α(1−b)
2
θ
h
1− b2−α −
1−α
2
i + α(1− b)
2
For completeness sake, we define an equilibrium below.
DEFINITION A steady-state equilibrium with no labor market participation by displaced work-
ers and internally funded pensions consists of wage functions wuo , w
e
o, and wy [defined in 27), and (28)],
and a quadruple (α, θ, U, Fv) satisfying the following conditions: (i) Symmetric Nash bargaining; (ii)
(Unrestricted Entry for firms): Πv = 0; (iii) (Steady-State): αU = θFv = µM(U,Fv), (iv) the labor
market participation constraints hold: Juo > 0, Jy > βJ
u
o , and J
e
o > (1−τ)Bo and the discouraged worker
constraint holds27, and v) the government’s budget is balanced.
27 In this case, the discouraged worker constraint requires
(1− τ)Bo > −s+ α [ws(1− τ) + δ (1− τ)Bo] + (1− α)(1− τ)Bo (30)
where
ws =
1− h+ (1− δ) (1− τ)Bo
2
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We choose a population-based average of expected lifetime utility of each group of workers as our
welfare criterion. In particular, we adopt the following measure of social welfare as our welfare crite-
rion:28
W ≡W (B0, δ) =
1
2
Jy +
1
2
αβ (1− d) (1− b)Jeo +
1
2
αβb (1− d)Jso +
1
2
β(1− α) (1− d)Juo
The task ahead is to compare aggregate welfare in the presence and absence of policy. In the presence
of (internally-funded) policy, the old and separated stay out of the labor market. In the absence of such
policy intervention, every worker participates in the labor market but there are no pension payments
or taxes. The question for us is: is aggregate welfare higher when no pension programs are present and
all workers remain active in the labor force?
As is readily apparent, a number of non-linearities enter the model with the introduction of the
government budget constraint especially when benefits are funded by distortionary taxes. Therefore,
we use numerical computations to illustrate our reasoning.
Example 3 Let s = 0.15, a = 0.2, µ = 0.4, h = 0.25, d = 0, φ = 0.5, B0 = 0, β = 0.9, and b = 0.2.
Under this parametric specification, pension programs are not present, and it can be checked that all
workers stay active in the labor market. The aggregate welfare in this case is 0.2095. Now consider
an otherwise identical parametric specification except that B0 is allowed to go from 0.25 to 0.4 and
δ = 0.8. By the government budget constraint, it follows that τ varies from 0.108781 to 0.17043. For
this specification, it can be verified that all the conditions defined in the definition of equilibrium in this
section are satisfied. As illustrated in Figure 1, aggregate welfare under induced retirement is higher
than when there are no public pension benefits and retirement does not occur. Importantly, wages to the
young are lower under policy than in the absence of pension programs.
Note that policy-induced retirement occurs as long as pension benefits are suﬃciently generous and
the implicit tax on elderly work is suﬃciently high (δ = 0.8 < 1). Once pension benefits are equal to
0.25, induced retirement occurs. In particular, we observe that publicly induced retirement generates
higher welfare since the vertical intercept in Figure 1 is equal to 0.24724. As mentioned in the above
example, welfare in the absence of pension programs is 0.2095.
Having established the desirability of publicly induced retirement based on welfare grounds, we now
turn to studying the interactions between pension benefits and other labor market conditions such as
population aging in an economy with induced retirement. In order to focus on explicit analytical results,
we choose to initially demonstrate our results in a partial equilibrium setting where pension benefits
are externally funded. However, as will be apparent in Section 8 below, the insights derived here are
robust to settings where a government balances pension benefits with required tax revenues.
28See Davidson et. al. (1994) for a similar welfare criterion.
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7 Partial equilibrium analysis
7.1 Increasing generosity of benefits
As discussed in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2003), many OECD countries have munificent pension
programs that induce the jobless elderly to retire and make way for the young. In this section, we
establish the eﬀects of varying the generosity of pension programs within an induced retirement equi-
librium. Assuming that an equilibrium exists, we are able to analytically derive the eﬀects of pension
benefits on employment and the age-composition of the labor force. We begin by reporting the results
of some comparative static exercises conducted with respect to B0. It bears emphasis here that all the
upcoming results assume away any issues relating to funding of B0 and are hence to be understood
as being “partial equilibrium” in nature. As Section 8 will demonstrate, these insights are robust to
settings in which pension benefits are funded endogenously by payroll taxes. The principal benefit of
the “partial equilibrium” perspective is that it allows us to derive a number of interesting clean results
analytically.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, an increase in B0 raises the probability of finding employment.
In particular, we have:
∂α
∂B0
=
2β [1− (1− b) (1− δ)]
[(1− h) (2 + β)− 4a] > 0. (31)
Holding α fixed, an increase in B0 reduces the wages of the young and at the same time raises the
wages of old workers with jobs. This raises the benefit from firm entry, and more firm entry makes
it easier for any given worker to find a vacancy thereby raising the employment rate. Therefore, we
refer to this transmission channel of pension programs as the “vacancy creation eﬀect.” On the face
of it, Proposition 3 is a formal statement of the type of argument governments use to defend generous
pension programs ostensibly intended to free up jobs for the young.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is the following corollary.
Corollary 1 An increase in B0 changes the age-composition of the labor force via
∂u˜y
∂B0
= − 1
(u˜y)
2 (1− d)
µ
− ∂α
∂B0
¶
> 0
∂u˜o
∂B0
= − 1h
1 + 1(1−α)(1−d)
i2 µ 1(1− d)
¶
−1
(1− α)2
(−) ∂α
∂B0
< 0
As established by Proposition 3, higher pension benefits increase the probability that any worker
is able to obtain employment. In particular, since there will be less workers who are unable to find
jobs when young, the pool of the long-term unemployed will be lower. Consequently, more generous
pension benefits raise the probability with which firms are likely to encounter a young worker. As we
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describe below, from examining (8), (9), and (12), this “vacancy creation eﬀect” has implications for
age-earnings profiles in the economy:
Proposition 4 An increase in B0 raises the wages to the old and employed and has no eﬀect on the
wages of the never-before-employed. The eﬀect on young wages is ambiguous.
The eﬀect on wy can be seen from the expression for wy, reproduced here for convenience:
2wy = (1− h)
µ
1 +
αβ (1− d)
2
¶
− (1− d)β (B0 + s)
On the one hand, a higher B0 raises α which serves to raise wy [the “vacancy creation eﬀect” i.e., workers
can find jobs more easily and hence their “price” must go up], but on the other hand, a higher B0 serves
to reduces wy [this is the “bargaining power redistribution eﬀect” that was discussed in Section 3]. The
net impact is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of the two aforementioned eﬀects. In
particular, the vacancy creation eﬀect somewhat compromises the income redistributive goal of social
security.
Under the linear matching technology, the eﬀect of an additional vacancy on the probability of
finding of a job can be substantial. This may even cause the wages of the young to rise with benefits.
Numerical computations confirm that with a small degree of non-linearity (φ < 1) in the matching
function, the “vacancy creation eﬀect” (an indirect influence) is muted and dominated by the direct
“bargaining power redistribution eﬀect”. Intuitively, the bargaining power redistribution eﬀect will
dominate the vacancy creation eﬀect as long as firms also encounter congestion problems in the labor
market, i.e., there is some degree of diminishing returns to the addition of another vacancy.29
Example 4 Consider the parametric specification of Example 2. Using this configuration, it is apparent
from Figure 2 that raising the level of benefits reduces the wages to the young and raises the wages to
the old and eligible, thereby accomplishing cross-cohort income redistribution.
This, in some sense, is a major punchline of the paper. In the model, pension programs raise the
incomes of the old with jobs and tend to reduce the incomes of the young, thereby engineering an
intergenerational income distribution towards the elderly. The novelty of our paper lies in the fact that
we can demonstrate the presence of such intergenerational income distribution in the complete absence
of any equity or political economy concerns.
The eﬀects of increasing benefits on variables such as the probability of employment, age-composition
of the labor force etc. are fairly similar to the results established analytically using a linear matching
technology. As is evident from Figures 3.1 and 3.2, higher benefits raise the employment probability
and reduce the chance that a firm will find a worker.
29See Bhattacharya, Mulligan, and Reed (2003) for further discussion.
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The next section studies the eﬀects of population aging and the design of pension programs for the
labor market.
7.2 Aging
The populations of many developed countries around the world have increasingly become older over the
past century. In the United States, for example, while 4% of the population was aged sixty-five years or
older in 1900, this number rose to 12.5% in 1994, and is projected to spiral up to 20% by 2050. At the
same time, the age composition of the labor force is also changing in a dramatic fashion. The median
age of the workforce in the United States is expected to cross 40 by 2005 compared to 34.7 in 1979. Our
structure allows us to study, albeit in a very stylized fashion, the general equilibrium eﬀects of aging.
Recall if d falls, then the increased longevity leads to a steady-state with population aging. Our first
result studies the eﬀect of increased longevity on the employment rate.
Proposition 5 Given a level of pension benefits, B0, aging (a lower value of d) reduces α thereby
increasing the unemployment rate.
The proof of this result follows straightforwardly from partially diﬀerentiating (24) with respect to
d, and is hence omitted. In our economy, unemployment is an equilibrium phenomenon. If workers tend
to live longer, then the population size of the long-term unemployed will increase. Consequently, the
total size of the pool of workers actively engaged in job search will be higher and each worker will be
less likely to find employment. This result again highlights the inter-generational conflicts which occur
in our framework.
Interestingly, with increased “greying” of their populations, many countries are shifting their atten-
tion to the unemployment problems of the elderly at the cost of reduced focus on youth unemployment.
The proposition makes the interesting point that, with aging, perhaps the concerns about youth unem-
ployment are even more valid. That is, the problem of youth unemployment may actually be exacerbated
by population aging since older workers will be further crowding out young workers in the labor market.
In fact, it is easy to verify that ∂u˜o∂d < 0 and
∂u˜y
∂d > 0 after taking into account the eﬀect of d on α. The
implication is that aging increases (reduces) the likelihood of firms getting matched with an old (young)
worker. The next result concerns the eﬀect of aging on young workers’ wages.
Proposition 6 Given a level of pension benefits, B0, aging reduces wages to the young.
The value of current employment to a young worker depends not only on the current level of wages,
but also on the anticipated continuation benefits derived from work if the worker survives till old age. A
fall in d raises this likelihood of survival and hence increases the expected future benefits, not only from
employment, but also from job displacement. As explained in Section 3, the firm extracts part of this
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surplus that it creates for the young worker; his wage is now lower. In addition, there is also the general
equilibrium eﬀect of population aging through the probability of finding a job — in an economy with a
lower d, there will be more workers engaged in job search which further lowers wages of the young. It
follows that aging also lowers the expected utility of the long-term unemployed. It has no eﬀect on those
who retain their jobs or those who retire. In a sense, aging itself engineers an income redistribution from
the young to the old with jobs, one that is totally independent of and complementary to, the income
redistributive eﬀect of pension programs discussed earlier.
7.3 The earnings penalty
Governments use a variety of “stick and carrot” measures to dissuade the jobless elderly from seeking
work. High implicit taxes and stringent earnings penalties on income earned beyond a certain age act
as sticks and are commonly utilized.30 In our setup, it is fairly straightforward to demonstrate that a
stiﬀer earnings test (fall in δ), given a level of pension benefits, reduces the probability of employment.
In other words, if maximizing employment is a goal of the government, then removal of the earnings
test is a movement in the right direction. It can also be verified that the earnings test has no eﬀect
on wages of the long-term unemployed while it raises wages of the old who have retained their jobs.
The intuition is clear. Earnings penalties reduce the value of working when old thereby making it more
attractive to withdraw from the labor market and collect their full benefits. Consequently, firms must
compensate by oﬀering higher wages. In addition, it can be shown that old workers obtain higher total
incomes when the earnings penalty is less severe. For a given α, this lowers the value of employment
for young workers causing wy to increase.
Proposition 7 (a) Given a level of pension benefits, B0, reducing the earnings penalty (an increase in
δ) raises the employment probability. (b) Given a level of pension benefits, B0, reducing the earnings
penalty (an increase in δ) raises the wages of the young and reduces the wages of the old with jobs.
The proof of Proposition 7 follows straightforwardly from diﬀerentiating (24) with respect to δ, and
using (12). The result highlights an interesting tension: on the one hand, by Lemma 3 a stiﬀ earnings
penalty is a necessary condition for publicly induced retirement to make room for the young. On the
other hand, from part (b) of Proposition 7, it is evident that increasing the stiﬀness of the earnings
penalty (reducing δ) interferes with the redistributive goals of public pension programs.
We conclude the section by presenting a result on the interaction between the generosity of pension
benefits and stiﬀness of earnings penalties. The result serves to show how the interaction between the
two instruments is quite like that between “the carrot and the stick”.
30Gruber and Wise (1999) report for the early 1990’s, the “typical” implicit tax rate for “someone of retirement age”
ranged from roughly 20% for Japan, U.S., and Canada, to more than 80% for Belgium and the Netherlands.
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Proposition 8 Suppose the government raises the level of pension benefits infinitesimally. If the prob-
ability of employment is held fixed, then the stiﬀness of the earnings penalty must also rise.
Proposition 8 describes a downward sloping iso-α curve on the (B0, δ) space. It captures the essence
of the interaction of the two instruments as being complementary to each other. If the level of benefits
is raised, and α is held fixed, then wages to young workers fall while wages to the old and eligible rise.
This makes it more attractive for the displaced workers to want to search. In a induced retirement
equilibrium, therefore, the earnings penalty must rise to keep them away from the labor market.
We now proceed to study the aggregate welfare consequences of changing the generosity of the
pension benefits or the strength of the earnings penalty.
7.4 Welfare
As discussed earlier, we adopt the following measure of social welfare as our welfare criterion:
W ≡W (B0; δ) =
1
2
Jy +
1
2
αβ (1− d) (1− b)Jeo +
1
2
αβb (1− d)Jso +
1
2
β(1− α) (1− d)Juo (32)
It is easy to verify that W may be written as
2W (Bo; δ) = −s− 2 (1− d) s+ 2α (1− d) s+ αwy + 2α (1− d) (1− b)weo
+2α (1− d) (1− b)δBo + 2αb (1− d)Bo + 2 (1− d)αwuo − 2α2 (1− d)wuo
Our next proposition writes down a simple suﬃcient condition on parameters that ensures that more
generous pension benefits, as long as they successfully induce the separated to withdraw, cause aggregate
welfare to go up.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied and additionally
3 (1− h)
4a
> max
½
[2δ (1− b) + 3 (1− 2b)]
[(1 + b) + (1− b)δ] , 0
¾
(33)
holds. Then, WBo (Bo; δ) > 0.
It bears emphasis here that Proposition 9 does not say anything about the optimal design of public
pension programs. All that it shows is that for a fixed earnings test and a pattern of labor force
participation induced by a public pension program, increasing the generosity of benefits can be welfare-
enhancing.
As motivated in Section (3), holding α fixed, an increase in pension benefits leads to a large income
redistribution from the young to the old. In equilibrium, there are additional eﬀects arising from the
impact of pension benefits on the incentives of firms to create more vacancies. This may raise the
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probability of employment for the jobless. In turn, young workers can negotiate higher wages since the
outside option of searching again when old has higher value. Therefore, an increase in pension benefits
raises welfare here because all workers are more likely to be employed and with higher wages (except,
of course, the long-term unemployed). Nevertheless, we find that the total expected income of the
old who receive benefits increases more than the average earnings of the young. This welfare result is
corroborated by Figure 4 which shows the positive welfare eﬀects of higher pension benefits using the
parameters from Example 2.
We conclude this section by investigating the impact of the earnings test on welfare in the economy.
As observed above, a lower earnings test further achieves the redistributive goals of social security
because it provides old individuals with even more income.
Proposition 10 Suppose an induced retirement equilibrium exists with α < 14 . Then, given a level of
pension benefits, B0, an increase in the earnings penalty (fall in δ) reduces welfare (W ).
The above result express an interesting quandary: on the one hand, by Lemma 3 a stiﬀ earnings
penalty is a necessary condition for publicly induced retirement to make room for the young. On the
other hand, it lowers old workers’ total incomes. Our findings imply that the earnings penalty should
be set high enough to generate retirement by the eligible jobless elderly, but not any further due to the
lost income of the old.
In summary of our results so far, we have established a number of important insights. First, public
pension programs exhibit a number of redistributive features. Notably, they can engineer income redis-
tribution from the young to the old via explicit transfer payments or through firms in the form of higher
wages since many social security programs have significant implicit taxes on elderly work. Second, we
have established a positive theory of public pensions since we have shown that retirement induced by
the structure of the public pension program can lead to higher welfare than when public pensions are
not available. Importantly, we have shown this occurs when pension benefits are funded by payroll
taxes imposed equally on both firms and workers. In addition, the eﬀects of social security interact with
population demographics in the labor market. Finally, as established by Proposition 10, it is important
to carefully design pension programs to balance their income redistributive goals with the requirements
to encourage retirement. In the next section, we turn to some additional issues regarding the design of
public pension programs along with an explicit government budget constraint.
8 General Equilibrium Eﬀects of Public Pension Design
In this section, we examine various features of social security programs in a setting where benefits
are funded by payroll taxes, as in Section 6. We conduct numerical experiments aimed at providing
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qualitative general equilibrium insights into the eﬀects of various labor market policies. Since we are
using numerical techniques, we choose to study an economy with a) a non-linear matching technology,
and b) a larger class of pension policies: benefits are no longer fixed and instead they depend on prior
contributions (earnings). In particular, we assume that pension benefits are equal to a fixed fraction η
of young wages. In this manner, η serves as our proxy for the replacement rate. We fix the values of
the following parameters to: β = 0.9, s = 0.1, a = 0.2, µ = 0.4, φ = 0.5, b = 0.3, and h = 0.3.31 Starting
from this benchmark set of parameters, we vary the replacement rate and the earnings penalty to gain
some insight into the eﬀect of each factor on aggregate labor market outcomes.
We begin by considering a case where there is a very high tax on elderly work — in this setting, public
pension programs mimic long-term unemployment insurance for older workers. Setting δ = 0.1, we find
that our conjectured induced retirement equilibrium exists starting with replacement rates equal to 81%.
That is, for replacement rates equal to and higher than 81%, all displaced workers choose to withdraw
from the labor market rather than incur the costs of job search and participate. Although higher pension
benefits are associated with higher tax rates, all other variables appear to behave qualitatively the same
as when pensions are externally funded. Importantly, under higher replacement rates, the young earn
less and older workers obtain higher incomes. Consequently, there is an increase in vacancies and a
lower unemployment rate.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, for a given earnings restriction (for example, δ = 0.1), policy-induced re-
tirement can improve aggregate labor market welfare. By eﬀectively allowing young workers to purchase
jobs from old individuals, public pension programs can improve the allocation of workers to jobs since
young workers will have a higher chance of finding long-term employment. As in many search models of
the labor market, workers here impose a congestion externality on the unemployed — for a fixed number
of vacancies, an increase in the number of workers renders it less likely that a given worker will find
a job. Furthermore, due to the possibility for the accumulation of firm-specific human capital in our
setup, allowing young workers to have a greater chance of finding employment improves the allocation
of workers to jobs in the economy.
Interestingly, since cross-cohort redistribution is achieved, more generous pensions are associated
with higher welfare despite any change in the labor market participation decisions of old workers. As
mentioned above, induced retirement occurs when the replacement rate is suﬃciently high. Thus, there
is a discontinuity in the welfare function when the induced retirement equilibrium is observed. This
31To reiterate, ours is not intended to be a fully-developed calibration exercise. While it would no doubt be interesting
to extend our framework to many-period OG models, this is not our focus here. The two period model allows us to easily
trace an old worker’s current employment status to his previous job history. It therefore provides a relatively tractable
structure to analytically demonstrate some important interactions between the design of public pension programs and
age-earnings profiles in the economy. The numerical exercises illustrate the general equilibrium eﬀects of such policies.
The two period framework provides a simple departure from standard infinite-horizon models of the labor market. Thus,
our parameter choices are not guided by the dictums of proper calibration; there is little available knowledge on these
parameters over a 25-30 year horizon, the real life length equivalent of a two-period OG model.
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takes place solely because of the change in the labor market participation decisions of displaced workers
— since there is a better alignment of workers to jobs in the labor market, the economy earns higher
welfare.
However, are there other combinations of η and δ that achieve higher aggregate welfare? The second
experiment focuses on the eﬀects of higher replacement rates when the earnings restriction is much less
severe — that is, for brevity, we consider the case of a zero earnings penalty. Thus, this corresponds
to a setting in which there is no earnings test. In many ways, the results are qualitatively similar to
the analysis in the first experiment. However, as alluded to in Lemma 3, induced retirement does not
occur. In contrast to economies in which there is a tax on work (δ < 1), wages of older workers are
unaﬀected by the provision of pension benefits. However, cross-cohort distribution still occurs since
public pensions raise the value of employment for the young causing wy to fall. Thus, redistribution
through firms in the form of higher wages no longer occurs. Since we assume that workers do not extract
all of the benefits from matching (symmetric Nash bargaining), the total incomes of older individuals
are higher for a given replacement rate when there are no taxes on elderly work.
As illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, we find the following: (i) for a given earnings test (δ fixed),
increasing the generosity of public pension programs improves aggregate welfare, and (ii) reducing the
severity of the earnings test may also be welfare-enhancing. Completely eliminating the earnings test
improves the redistribution of income over the lifecycle. Furthermore, at higher replacement rates, the
drop in the payroll costs of young workers outweigh the higher costs of employing old workers so that
there is more employment as a result of the redistribution.
Thus, for a given earnings test, policy-induced retirement will improve labor market welfare. This
occurs for two reasons: (i) allocating a higher proportion of jobs towards young workers leads to a
more eﬃcient allocation in the labor market due to the accumulation of firm-specific human capital
and (ii) public pension programs play a role in terms of redistribution of bargaining power and income
across the lifecycle. However, in contrast to policy-induced retirement, completely eliminating work
disincentives in pension programs leads to the following: (i) better income redistribution, (ii) more
labor market participation, and potentially (iii) more vacancy creation due to the eﬀect of the pension
programs on age-earnings profiles in the economy. Therefore, we illustrate that recent policy reforms
aimed at reducing work disincentives towards the elderly allow the redistributive role of social security
to function more eﬀectively and that the welfare eﬀects of promoting total employment may be more
important than improving the quality of employment (by encouraging the elderly to “free up” jobs for
the young).
30
9 Conclusion
Most countries have large public pension programs. Traditionally, these programs have been used to
induce retirement by the elderly in order to free up jobs for the young and to redistribute income across
generations. This paper provides an eﬃciency rationale for the inter-generational income redistribution
focus of such programs in a framework which explicitly accounts for the role of the lifecycle in the labor
market. It develops a model of the labor market characterized by search and matching frictions and
embeds it into an overlapping generations framework. In our model, public pension programs alter
the age composition of the labor force by inducing the jobless elderly to retire in exchange for pension
benefits. By requiring a long history of labor market attachment in order to receive benefits, these
programs raise the future value of current employment for the young. In turn, this raises the future
value of current employment which serves to redistribute bargaining power, and hence income, from
the young to the old. In addition, depending on the design of the pension program, we show that the
redistribution can take place directly via the government (explicit transfer payments) or indirectly via
firms in the form of higher wages. This substitutability of one form of redistribution for another is an
important, yet neglected dimension in the debate about social security reform currently in progress in
all OECD countries.
We believe that careful general equilibrium analysis of the underlying issues can shed important light
and oﬀer some guidance to policymakers. In this regard, we have ventured to study the eﬃciency and
desirability of publicly-funded pension programs within the context of a dynamic general equilibrium
model. In order to consider how age-targeted labor market policies such as social security should be
designed in light of the ongoing trend towards an increasingly older population, we adopted the OG
setup because it allows a natural and explicit separation of the workforce into young and old workers.
The framework captures an important inter-generational conflict between the young and old since, in
the model, these groups concurrently compete for the same jobs; additionally, the bargaining power of
the two during wage negotiations are diﬀerent due to their diﬀerent positions on the lifecycle. Moreover,
the OG structure is naturally conducive to studying pension programs that tie in with the lifecycle and
other “low frequency” aspects of the labor market, such as, long job tenure, and the accumulation of
firm-specific human capital.
We used the search framework in the labor market for three important reasons. First, it allows us
to endogenize both the supply side (through labor market participation choices) and the demand side
(via endogenous creation of vacancies) of the labor market, a clear departure from the “lump-of-labor”
line of thought in which there is a fixed stock of job vacancies. Importantly, we see that the amount of
job creation responds to the design of pension programs through their impact on age earnings profiles
in the economy.
Second, the retirement literature suggests that social security programs are designed to reduce labor
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market congestion problems for the young. The diminished prospects for job search are also a prominent
factor in the labor market participation decisions of older workers. In this regard, we argue that a model
with undirected search is appropriate since it allows us to demonstrate how labor market congestion
contributes to potential intergenerational conflicts in the labor market. If firms were perfectly able to
discriminate on the basis of age, this would imply that there are not any intergenerational congestion
diﬃculties between workers and therefore, there would be little role for policy-induced retirement.
Finally, the decentralized notion of wage bargaining used in our framework allows us to study the
eﬀects of public pension programs on wage determination at each stage of the lifecycle. This is especially
important given the fact that most real-world pension benefits are generally related in some way to the
number of years worked and tend to increase with lifetime earnings. In this context, an important new
eﬀect that we identify is the role of social security in redistributing bargaining power over the lifecycle.
In our setup, younger workers have the option of waiting while older (equally productive) workers do
not. This bargaining-power inequity translates into high wages for the young, escalating labor costs
(since young workers constitute the largest pool of the unemployed from which firms will have to find
workers), and reduces firm entry. Positive replacement rates, raise the lifetime value of working when
young and thereby reduces this ineﬃciency. Our work therefore oﬀers a positive explanation for the
prevalence of social security programs around the world.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
In a steady state, contribution to the unemployed pool come from two sources, young workers (measure
0.5) and never-before-employed workers, of measure (1−α)(1−d)2 . Then, it follows that
U =
(1− α) (1− d)
2
+
1
2
=
1 + (1− α) (1− d)
2
u˜y ≡
uy
U
=
1
1 + (1− α) (1− d)
u˜o ≡
uo
U
=
(1− α) (1− d)
1 + (1− α) (1− d)
B Proof of Lemma 2
a) Using (10), we can compute the gains from trade for the firm from hiring a young worker as:
1−h−wy+(1− d) bβΠv+(1−b) (1− d)βΠf+dβΠv−βΠv = 1−h−wy+(1−b) (1− d)βΠf+[(1− d) b+ d− 1]βΠv
which using (5) and rearrangement yields
= (1− h− wy) + (1− b) (1− d)β (1− weo)
Using (11), and (1)-(3), the young worker’s surplus from finding employment is given by:
wy + b (1− d)βJso + (1− b) (1− d)βJeo − β (1− d)Juo
= wy + b (1− d)βBo + (1− b) (1− d)βweo + (1− b) (1− d)βδBo + β (1− d) s− β (1− d)αwuo
and further to
= wy + b (1− d)βBo + (1− b) (1− d)βweo + (1− b) (1− d)βδBo + β (1− d) s−
β (1− d)α (1− h)
2
Then, equating the gains from trade, we get
2wy = (1− h)+(1−b) (1− d)β (1− 2weo)−b (1− d)βBo−(1−b) (1− d) δβBo−β (1− d) s+
β (1− d)α (1− h)
2
which simplifies to
= (1− h)− (1− d)βB0 [(1− b) (1− δ) + b+ (1− b)δ]− β (1− d) s+
β (1− d)α (1− h)
2
Notice that [(1− b) (1− δ) + b+ (1− b)δ] = 1. Then, we have
2wy = (1− h)
µ
1 +
αβ (1− d)
2
¶
− (1− d)β (B0 + s) .
b) obvious.
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C Proof of Lemma 4
a) It is easily seen that, as long as the discouraged worker constraint holds, the young will choose to
search as long as there are positive gains from entry within the period:
αwy(α) > s
which reduces to
(1− h) (1− d)α2 + 2[(1− h)− (1− d) (B0 + s)]α− 4s > 0.
Solving the above condition for a value of α in which it holds with equality provides us with a minimal
value for α. Note that if (1− h) > (1− d) (B0 + s), then we must use the positive root as the solution
for α. Define αL as the value of α which satisfies the condition (note, this is the same suﬃcient condition
that was required for young wages to be positive). It is given by:
αL ≡
−[(1− h)− (1− d)β (B0 + s)] + 2
p
[(1− h)− (1− d)β (B0 + s)]2 + 4β(1− h)(1− d)s
β (1− h) (1− d)
which is always positive as long as there are some search costs to be incurred by workers.
b) We seek to find conditions where αL > 2s(1−h) . First, recall b1 ≡ [(1− h)− (1− d) (B0 + s)].Thus,
αL ≡
−b1 + 2
p
b21 + 4β(1− h)(1− d)s
β (1− d) (1− h) >
2s
(1− h)
reduces to
−b1 + 2
q
b21 + 4β(1− h)(1− d)s > 2β(1− d)s
and further to
2
q
b21 + 4β(1− h)(1− d)s > b1 + 2β(1− d)s
Next, squaring both sides yields:
b21 + 4β(1− h)(1− d)s > (b1 + 2β(1− d)s)2
which upon simplifying obtains:
0 > −2 (1− d)βB0 − β(1− d)s
which always holds.
D Proof of Proposition 1
a) Using (23), and setting θ = 1, we getµ
a
u˜y
¶
= (1− h− wy) + (1− b)(1− d)β (1−weo) +
µ
u˜o
u˜y
¶
(1− h− wuo )
We begin by substituting in the steady-state population conditions from Lemma 1. Then, we use (8),
(9), and (12) to get
a [1 + (1− α) (1− d)] = (1− h− wy)+ β(1−b)(1−d)
µ
1− 1 + (1− δ)Bo
2
¶
+(1− α) (1− d)
µ
1− h− (1− h)
2
¶
.
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Simplification yields
2a+ 2a(1− α) (1− d) = (1− h) + (1− d)βB0 + (1− d)βs−
(1− d)βα (1− h)
2
+β(1− b)(1− d)− β(1− b)(1− d) (1− δ)Bo + (1− α) (1− d) (1− h)
which further simplifies to
(1− α) [2a− (1− h)] + αβ (1− h)
2
=
(1− h)
(1− d) + βs+ β(1− b) + βB0 [1− (1− b) (1− δ)]−
2a
(1− d)
and finally to
α =
2(1−h)
(1−d) + 2βs+ 2β(1− b) + 2βB0 [1− (1− b) (1− δ)]−
4a
(1−d) − [4a− 2 (1− h)]
[(1− h) (2 + β)− 4a]
Notice that
2 (1− h)
(1− d) −
4a
(1− d) − [4a− 2 (1− h)] = 2
µ
1
(1− d) + 1
¶
[(1− h)− 2a] .
Then, it follows that
α = 2
⎧
⎨
⎩
βs+ β(1− b) + βB0 [1− (1− b) (1− δ)] +
³
1
(1−d) + 1
´
[(1− h)− 2a]
[(1− h) (2 + β)− 4a]
⎫
⎬
⎭
E Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that firms enter until Πv = 0, or until the revenue from entry equals the upfront cost a. Also
recall that firms take u˜y and u˜o as given, and that wuo does not depend on B0. Then the revenue from
entry R can be written as
R = u˜y (1− h− wy) + u˜y(1− b)(1− d)β (1− weo) + u˜o (1− h−wuo )
Using (8), (9), and (12), we get
R = u˜y
µ
(1− h)− (1− h)
2
µ
1 +
αβ (1− d)
2
¶
+
(1− d)β (B0 + s)
2
¶
+u˜y(1− b)(1− d)β
µ
1− 1 + (1− δ)Bo
2
¶
+ u˜o (1− h− wuo )
which simplifies ultimately to
R = u˜y
∙
(1− h)
2
− (1− h)
2
αβ (1− d)
2
+
(1− d) (B0 + s)
2
¸
+
u˜y(1− b)(1− d)β
2
[1− (1− δ)Bo] + u˜o (1− h−wuo )
It follows that
∂R
∂Bo
= u˜y
(1− d)
2
− u˜y(1− b)β(1− d) (1− δ)
2
=
u˜y (1− d)
2
[1− (1− b)β (1− δ)] > 0
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so, an increase in B0 raises the benefit from entry but does not raise the cost. Hence, ceteris paribus,
there will be more firm entry with higher B0. The fact that more firm entry leads to a higher probability
of employment follows immediately from diﬀerentiating (24) to get
∂α
∂B0
> 0
F Proof of Proposition 6
Using (12), we can write
wy =
(1− h)
2
+
(1− h)αβ (1− d)
4
− (1− d)β (B0 + s)
2
Then, straightforward diﬀerentiation yields
∂wy
∂d
=
(1− h)
4
∙
∂α
∂d
β (1− d)− α
¸
+
β (B0 + s)
2
which using (9) yields
∂wy
∂d
=
(1− h)
4
∂α
∂d
β (1− d)− 1
2
[αwuo − β (B0 + s)]
Recall that the displaced worker constraint implies
Bo > −s+ αws + (1− α)Bo
which reduces to
αBo > −s+
α
2
(1− h) + α
2
Bo
and further to [using (9)]
α
2
Bo −Bo > αwuo − βs− βBo
and finally to
0 >
1
2
Bo
³α
2
− 1
´
>
1
2
[αwuo − β (B0 + s)]
Using Proposition 5, it follows that ∂wy∂d > 0.
G Proof of Proposition 8
Fix α at α¯. Then the question is: if Bo increases, how should δ change to keep α fixed at α¯? Rearranging
(24), we can write
βB0 [1− (1− b) (1− δ)] =
α¯
2 [3 (1− h)− 4a] −
µ
1
(1− d) + 1
¶
[(1− h)− 2a]− βs− β(1− b) (h.1)
The derivative of the r.h.s of (h.1) with respect to B0 is clearly 0. The derivative of the l.h.s of (h.1)
with respect to B0 reduces to
dδ
dB0
=
− [1− (1− b) (1− δ)]
βB0(1− b)
< 0
so the earnings penalty has to increase when generosity of benefits increases, so as to keep employment
rate fixed.
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H Proof of Proposition 9
For future use, note that
∂wy
∂Bo
=
(1− h)
2
β (1− d)
2
∂α
∂B0
− β (1− d)
2
∂weo
∂Bo
= (1− δ) /2
Simple diﬀerentiation establishes
WBo (Bo; δ) = α
∙
∂wy
∂Bo
+ 2 (1− d) (1− b)∂w
e
o
∂Bo
+ 2 (1− d) (1− b)δ + 2b (1− d)− 2 (1− d)wuo
∂α
∂B0
¸
+ [2W (Bo; δ) + s+ 2 (1− d) s]
∂α
∂B0
which upon rearrangement simplifies to
WBo (Bo; δ) = α
∙
(1− h)
2
(1− d)
2
∂α
∂B0
− (1− d)
2
+ (1− d) (1− b) (1 + δ) + 2b (1− d)− (1− d) (1− h) ∂α
∂B0
¸
+ [2W (Bo; δ) + s+ 2 (1− d) s]
∂α
∂B0
Note that
2b (1− d)− (1− d)
2
= (1− d)
∙
2b− 1
2
¸
= −(1− d) (1− 4b)
2
.
Then it follows that
W1 (Bo; δ) = α (1− d)
∙
(1− h)
2
1
2
∂α
∂B0
− (1− 4b)
2
+ (1− b) (1 + δ)− (1− h) ∂α
∂B0
¸
+ [2W (Bo; δ) + s+ 2 (1− d) s]
∂α
∂B0| {z }
≡V >0
which simplifies to
W1 (Bo; δ) = −
∂α
∂B0
3α (1− d) (1− h)
4
+
α (1− d)
2
[2(1− b) (1 + δ)− (1− 4b)] + V
Using (31), we can then write
W1 (Bo; δ) = −
2 [1− (1− b) (1− δ)]
[3 (1− h)− 4a]
3α (1− d) (1− h)
4
+
α (1− d)
2
[2(1− b) (1 + δ)− (1− 4b)] + V
and finally,
W1 (Bo; δ) =
α (1− d)
2
½
[2(1− b) (1 + δ)− (1− 4b)]− [1− (1− b) (1− δ)] 3 (1− h)
[3 (1− h)− 4a]
¾
+ V
Then, a suﬃcient condition for welfare to rise with B0 is that
2(1− b) (1 + δ)− (1− 4b) > [1− (1− b) (1− δ)] 3 (1− h)
[3 (1− h)− 4a]
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hold. This last inequality upon multiple rearrangements reduces to
3 (1− h)
4a
>
[(1− 4b) + 2(1− b) (1 + δ)]
[2(1− b) (1 + δ)− (1− 4b)− 1 + (1− b) (1− δ)]
and finally to
3 (1− h)
4a
>
[2δ (1− b) + 3 (1− 2b)]
[(1 + b) + (1− b)δ]
I Proof of Proposition 10
For the purposes of evaluating the eﬀect of an increase in δ on welfare, the only relevant terms are
α [2 (1− d) s+ wy + 2 (1− d) (1− b)weo + 2 (1− d) (1− b)δBo + 2b (1− d)Bo + 2 (1− d)wuo − 2α (1− d)wuo ]
Then, diﬀerentiating with respect to δ yields
W 0 (δ;Bo) =
∂α
∂δ
[2W (δ;Bo) + s+ 2 (1− d) s]
+α
∙
∂wy
∂δ
+ 2 (1− d) (1− b)∂w
e
o
∂δ
+ 2 (1− d) (1− b)Bo − 2 (1− d)
(1− h)
2
∂α
∂δ
¸
Using (8)-(9) and noting that
∂wy
∂δ
=
(1− h) (1− d)
4
∂α
∂δ
,
we get
W 0 (δ;Bo) =
∂α
∂δ
[2W (δ;Bo) + s+ 2 (1− d) s]
+α
∙
(1− h) (1− d)
4
∂α
∂δ
− (1− d) (1− b)Bo + 2 (1− d) (1− b)Bo − (1− d) (1− h)
∂α
∂δ
¸
Repeated simplification yields
W 0 (δ;Bo) =
∂α
∂δ
∙
2W (δ;Bo) + s+ 2 (1− d) s−
3
4
α (1− d) (1− h)
¸
+ α (1− d) (1− b)Bo
and further
W 0 (δ;Bo) = α
∂α
∂δ
⎡
⎣ 2 (1− d) s+ wy + 2 (1− d) (1− b)w
e
o + 2 (1− d) (1− b)δBo
+2b (1− d)Bo + 2 (1− d)wuo − 2α (1− d)wuo − 34 (1− d) (1− h)
⎤
⎦+α (1− d) (1−b)Bo
and finally
W 0 (δ;Bo) = α
∂α
∂δ| {z }
>0
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
µ
2s− 3
2
wuo
¶
+
wy
1− d + 2(1− b)w
e
o + 2(1− b)δBo + 2bBo + 2wuo (1− α)| {z }
>0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
+α (1− d) (1− b)Bo| {z }
>0
.
Suppose
2wuo (1− α) >
3
2
wuo
then it follows that 1 > 4α holds. The rest is immediate.
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Figure 3.1: Effect of Higher Pension Benefits on Probability of 
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Figure 3.2: Effects of Higher Pension Benefits on Probability of Filling 
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Figure 4: Effects of Higher Pension Benefits on Welfare under Cobb 
Douglas Matching Technology
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Figure 5: Aggregate Welfare (δ =.1)
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Figure 6.1: Aggregate Welfare (δ =.9)
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